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The Maryland Court of Appeals has just handed down an
opinion, in a case not yet reported, which is of very general
interest in view of the current agitation for tax reform and the
spread of Mr. Henry George's theory of the "single tax." The
case arose out of the attempt of the Town of Hyattsville, Md., to
make a practical application of the single tax theory. The town
obtained from the Legislature in 1892 an amendment of its
charter which provided that land and the improvements thereon
should be separately assessed for the purposes of taxation but
made no provision whatever for assessing personal property. The
Town Commissioners were made a "Board of Appeal, Equaliza-
tion and Control," who, on an appeal by an aggrieved tax-payer,
were empowered to make "such deduction or exception from or
addition to the assessment made by the assessors, as they may deem
just, and to correct errors or illegal assessments," etc. Under
this act the land and improvements were assessed separately and
the personality not at all. Then, although no appeal had been
taken by any tax-payer, the Commissioners, of their own motion,
struck from the assessment roll the entire valuation on improve-
ments and levied a tax of 25 cents on each $ioo of the assessed
value of the land. The matter was brought before the court on a
petition for a mandamus to compel the Commissioners to restore
the improvements to the assessment roll, to assess all personal
property, and prohibit the collection of the taxes actually levied.
The court held, in the first place, that the Commissioners had
no right under the statute to strike from the roll the assessment on
buildings and improvements, but that their powers were "strictly
confined to a revision of the assessment previously made by the
Assessors," and that I any other construction would not only lead
to the greatest confusion, but would repudiate the long and well-
settled doctrine that exemptions from taxation are never pre-
sumed and are only allowed when clearly and unequivocally
granted."
The court, however, went further than this and declared the
whole act under which the taxes were laid to be null and void as
in conflict with a section of the "Declaration of Rights" in the
State Constitution which provides that "every person in the
State, or person holding property therein, ought to contribute
his proportion of public taxes for the support of the Government,
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according to his actual worth in real and personal property;
yet fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or
laid with a political view for the good government and benefit
of the community." This principle that every kind of property
should be alike subject to the burdens of taxation the court held
to be a part of the organic law of Maryland, uniformly and
consistently followed, and "eminently just in itself as a sound and
long-accepted axiom of political economy." The "single tax"
system is denounced as "an experimental if not visionary scheme,
which, if suffered to obtain a foothold, will inevitably lead to
ruinous results. * * * If the assessed valuations upon
buildings and improvements and upon personal property
be stricken from the assessment books and the taxes be
levied only upon the owners of the land, the burden would
speedily become insufferable and land would cease to be
worth owning. Such a system would eventually destroy individ-
ual ownership in the soil, and, under the guise of taxation, would
result in ultimate confiscation. The wisdom of providing in the
organic law against such abuses is obvious, and the provision by
which the people of the State are protected against them embodies
a fundamental principle which underlies the American system of
taxation." While this decision will doubtless not convince the
advocates of the "single tax" that their theory is unsound and
necessarily un-American, it does show the difficulties in the way
of any such change in our system of taxation, which can only be
accomplished by constitutional amendment in those States whose
constitutions contain provisions similar to that of Maryland.
When a negotiable instrument remains unpaid at maturity,
and suit is brought for collection, it often happens that the attor-
ney's fees cover almost the whole amount collected. It has there-
fore become the practice in some localities to insert in all promis-
sory notes a stipulation that, if suit has to be brought for payment,
the maker shall also pay collection expenses. What, then, is the
effect of such a clause? We find various irreconcilable positions
held in the different States. The courts of Louisiana, Arkansas,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, and the United States Circuit Courts in
Kansas and Oregon have fully upheld such stipulations as a part
of the note. It has been held in Pennsylvania, Missouri, Wiscon-
sin and Minnesota, that the stipulation may be enforced, but that
it renders the instrument non-negatiable, in making the amount to
be paid uncertain. Michigan and Kentucky go still farther, in
considering it to be in the form of a penalty, and therefore to be
COMMENT.
treated as mere surplusage. But the most radical position has
been taken in Ohio and Nebraska, where the courts have held
that such a stipulation is a mere cloak for usury, and therefore
avoids the whole transaction. It seems difficult to perceive any
justice in such a view; if the note is paid, as it ought to be, at
maturity, the clause is of no effect; but if it is not, should the
creditor be put to a loss and not be allowed compensation for
expenses incurred solely through the debtor's fault? We find an
analogy to this in the practice of inserting similar clauses in
leases of real property. A recent case in North Carolina (Tinsley
v. Hoskins, i6 S. E. Rep. 325), however, holds such a clause to be
a form of usury; in the words of the court: "We are of the
opinion that stipulations, like the one now sued upon, when
incorporated into obligations of this particular character, are
against public policy and therefore invalid." But the 
latest
decision on this subject, Dorsey v. Wolff, 32 N. E. Rep. 495 (Ill.),
is in conformity with what appears now to be the preponderance
of authority, in holding such a provision as valid, and in no 
man-
ner affecting the validity or negotiability of the instrument.* *
The decision of Judge Gresham, in the case of In re Interstate
Commerce Commission, 53 Fed. Rep. 476, marks an epoch in the
history of governmental regulation of railroad management, 
in
this country. It was here held that the clause in the Interstate
Commerce Act empowering Circuit Courts to make 
orders
enforcing subpoenas issued by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, was unconstitutional, on the ground that the Commission
was merely an administrative, not a judicial body, and since 
the
jurisdiction of the United States Courts, under the Constitution,
is purely a judicial one over certain specified cases or controver-
sies and an application for aid in obtaining evidence 
from an
administrative body not being such a "case" or "controversy" 
as
is enumerated, nothing is brought before the court for 
adjudication
and it has no power to act. The judicial department is 
distinct
from the administrative and Congress cannot make it an 
instru-
ment of any other department. The only remedy, 
therefore, in
case of the refusal of a railroad to obey the orders of the 
Commis-
sion is by a regular prosecution, brought in the courts, as 
for any
other violation of any other United States law. However 
desir-
able the restriction of the evils against which this act 
was aimed
may be, it seems very evident that the decision of 
the Circuit
Court in this case was in accordance with a true construction 
of
the Constitution.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently passed upon
the novel question whether a land-owner, who has conveyed with-
out reservation the coal lying under the surface, retains his title to
oil, gas, and other substances beneath the coal, and if so, what are
his rights of access. The court found little difficulty in reaching
the conclusion that both the title and the right of access to the
underlying strata remained in the grantor. But here began a
divergence of opinion, a bare majority holding that the exercise
and enforcement of the right of access were not for the judiciary
but for the legislature to regulate; that a court of equity will listen
to a petitioner and declare his rights but will not necessarily
enforce them. The minority went further, and while not approv-
ing the application of the doctrine of a surface right of way of
necessity to the facts of this case, as suggested by the court below,
nevertheless, laid down the broad proposition that the several
strata composing the earth's crust are, by virtue of their order and
arrangement, subject to reciprocal servitudes. Right of access to a
lower stratum is as much a servitude as is the right of support, or
the right of a land-owner, as against the owner above him, to insist
on the delivery of a stream of water to his land within its natural
channel. As these servitudes are imposed by the laws of nature,
the courts should and do recognize and enforce them, independent
of all statutory enactments. This latter view, of the minority,
certainly seems the more reasonable. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v.
_Mellon, 25 Atl. Rep. 597.
In the noted trial of T. Thatcher Graves for the murder of
Mrs. Barnaby, the lower court admitted evidence as part of the
res gestae which was undoubtedly hearsay in its character and
prejudicial in its effect upon the jury. It was largely on this
account that the Supreme Court of Colorado recently granted a
new trial (32 Pac. R. 63). A sample of the evidence so admitted
is found in the testimony of one of the State's witnesses from
which we quote: "The next morning she (Mrs. Barnaby)
seemed a little brighter. She knew that she had taken poison at
that time. I asked if she thought the Bennetts could have
sent the stuff. She said, 'No.' I asked her, ' Do you think Dr.
Graves could have sent it?' and she did not answer me." Other
evidence of the same kind was admitted on the same ground.
The rule against the admission of hearsay evidence is a wise and
perhaps an absolutely necessary one, and courts cannot guard too
carefully against evidence which bears that stamp, especially
where a human life depends upon the outcome of a trial. This
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leads us to further remark that the doctrine of res gestae is, or
ought to be, one of very limited application. Courts seem some-
times to forget this and to stretch this doctrine far beyond its log-
ical and natural bounds.
In the case of Hite v. Hite, 20 S. W. Rep. 778, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky was called upon to decide whether stock divi-
dends were income and as such would go to a life tenant, or
whether they were capital and as such would belong to the
remainder man. The court very unhesitatingly decided that there
was no reason in the nature of things why profits in the form of
stock should not go to the life tenant. This is the Pennsylvania
rule as laid down in Earp's 4ppeal, 28 Pa. State 368, while in Gib-
bons v. fahone, 136 U. S. 549, the United States Supreme Court
follows the English -rule holding that stock dividends are capital.
The addition of Kentucky to the States in which the doctrine of-
Gibbons v. Mahone is not considered law makes it seem altogether
unlikely that a uniform rule on this point will soon be established
in this country. We are not prepared to say which line of decis-
ions seems to be based upon the better reasoning, but we do
think that one rule would be more satisfactory than two. Let us
have greater uniformity in the law. Such a thing is far from
impossible and is highly desirable.
Another decision has recently been added to the long list of those
dealing with the troublesome question of interstate commerce.
The case of Harmon v. Chicago, 29 N. E. 732 (Ill.), noted in Vol-
ume I. of this Journal (p. 172), has been reversed by the United
States Supreme Court (1 3 Supreme Court Rep. 3o6). The ques-
tion was as to the validity of an ordinance of the City of Chicago
requiring the payment of a license fee on steam tugs which were
enrolled and licensed in the coasting trade of the United States,
under the provisions of the Revised Statutes, and which were
actually engaged in towing vessels from Lake Michigan to the
Chicago River. The Supreme Court of the United States held-
and we think rightly held-that the ordinance was void as con-
flicting with the exclusive power of Congress to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce, notwithstanding the fact that the
city had from time to time expended money in deepening the
river to make it more suitable for purposes of navigation.
Dog law is peculiar and although largely dependent on statute,
is always of general interest. In a recent New York case (Quilty
YALE LA W JO URNAL.
v. Battie et a., 32 N. E. Rep. 47), the court held that a wife made
herself liable to a person bitten by her husband's vicious dog.
This at first sight is peculiar, but it appeared that the wife
owned the premises where the dog was kept, and on which the
unfortunate event occurred, and, as in New York the wife has the
same property rights as if unmarried, the husband is not a proper
party defendant in cases of trespass committed by her in the man-
agement of her estate. Such a dog is not a necessary equipment
of a well-ordered household, and she should not only have used
her moral influence, but should have gently and firmly insisted
on her legal rights, and had the dog removed from the premises.
Last year we commented on a Mississippi case, in which it was
held that a police officer was justified in shooting a dog which
had escaped to the street without fault of the owner, although
the owner's wife was in pursuit, and the dog was doing no harm.
In a recent Michigan case, however, it was held that a person
was not justified in shooting a dog without notice to the owner,
although the dog at the time was trespassing on his premises.
Even this is not strange, but when it is considered that the afore-
said dog was in the habit of calling at night and barking loudly,
had walked on a freshly painted porch, and by way of pleasing
variety had frisked with the hens and chased cats into the trees,
it would seem that even the most peaceful citizen would be likely
to lose his temper and do something rash.
* 4 *
The decision in the case of People ex rel. Post v. Cross, 32 N. E.
Rep. 246, is in direct opposition to ex parte McKnight (28 N. E.
Rep. 1034) noticed in Volume I. of the LAW JOURNAL, p. 134.
It was here held, by the Supreme Court of Ohio, that a pris-
oner, extradited from another State for some particular offense,
could not b'e tried for another crime, not mentioned in the requi-
sition papers. In the case of Post, however, who was extradited from
Wisconsin, on the charge of grand larceny and afterwards tried for
robbery, the court held that the State was not thus restricted in
interstate extradition, although the contrary was true whenever
a foreign country was concerned. A decision on a mooted ques-
tion from a tribunal of authority is always valuable, and in this
case the New York opinion seems to have the weight of authority
in its favor. See Wharton's Crim. Plead. and Prac., § 37, P. 27,
with cases cited.
